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I. Introduction
On September 1, 1987, United States law enforcement officials lured
Fawaz Yunis, a Lebanese resident-citizen suspected of conducting the
1985 hijacking of a Jordanian airliner,1 onto a yacht anchored in interna-
tional waters in the Mediterranean Sea, where they arrested him.2 Attor-
ney General Edwin Meese acknowledged that it was the first time a
suspected terrorist had been arrested overseas by United States law en-
forcement officials. 3 He insisted that these officials had legal authority to
seize Yunis and transport him to the United States under a hostage-tak-
ing statute enacted by Congress in 1984.4
In the case that followed, United States v. Yunis, 5 two critical issues of
international law emerged. First, did the United States have jurisdiction
over the hijacking of a Jordanian airliner where the only connection be-
tween the hijacking and the United States was the chance presence of
three United States citizens on board the hijacked airliner?6 Second, was
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1. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 912 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd 859 F.2d 953 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
2. Id.; see also N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1987, at Al, col. 5; Taking on Terrorists, U.S. NEws
& WORLD REP., Sept. 12, 1988, at 26.
3. N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1987, at Al, col. 5.
4. Id. at All, col. 5-6. The legal authority to which Meese pointed was the Hostage Tak-
ing Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988). The Hostage Taking Act is the domestic statute providing
legal authority for apprehension of a suspected hostage-taker. It was first introduced in Con-
gress in 1984 to implement the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec.
17, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46), U.N. Doe. A/34/46, reprinted in
18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979).
5. 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988).
6. Id. at 899 ("There is no dispute that the only nexus to the United States was the pres-
ence of several American nationals on board the flight."). Two of the three American nation-
als on board the Jordanian flight were Professor Landry T. Slade, assistant to the president of
the American University of Beirut, and his 18 year-old son. The flight had approximately 60
passengers on board. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1985, at A8, col. 4-5.
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a suspect in a hijacking "found" within the United States for purposes of
the Hostage Taking Act where the suspect had been forcibly abducted to
the United States? 7
This article examines the district court's reliance on the nationality of
chance occupants of the hijacked airliner and on the purported universal
condemnation of hijacking to justify its exercise of jurisdiction. The arti-
cle argues that jurisdiction was not justified under either domestic or in-
ternational law. The article concludes that if the United States continues
to broaden unjustifiably the scope of well-established principles of inter-
national law as it did in Yunis, it is likely to invite reciprocal conduct
against the United States by the very states which sponsor terrorism.
II. Background: Consistency of United States Case Law with
International Law
Unlike domestic law, international law claims no statutory structure of
its own. International law is based primarily upon custom, treaties and
conventions, and the general principles of law recognized by nations. It
is also based on judicial decisions and the treatises of highly qualified
publicists. 8
The fundamental basis of international law does not spring from con-
sent to a legislatively-mandated set of rules, but rather from consent to
certain modes of behavior among states. 9 Consequently, it is imperative
that accepted customs are more, rather than less, closely adhered to as
the relationships between nations in the world community become both
more complex and more fragile.
When a distinguished group of scholars drafted the Harvard Research
Draft in 1935,10 they were articulating those principles of international
7. One of the principal jurisdictional components of the Hostage Taking Act is that "the
offender is found in the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1)(B) (1988).
8. J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 34-35 (7th ed. 1972) (referring to
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para. 1).
9. D. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1970) (citing Phleger, Legal Advisor to the U.S.
State Department, quoting 1 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW at 2):
International law has been defined as those rules of international conduct which have met
general acceptance among the community of nations. It reflects and records those accom-
modations which, over centuries, states have found it in their interest to make. It rests
upon the common consent of civilized communities.
10. See Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction With Respect to
Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 437 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research Draft]. According
to article 2, entitled "Scope of Convention," the Harvard Research Draft sought to define and
limit a state's jurisdiction with respect to crime but cautioned that nothing in its provisions
would preclude any of the parties to the Convention from entering into other agreements, or
from giving effect to other agreements then in force, concerning competence to prosecute and
punish for crime which affected only the parties to such other agreements. Id. at 439.
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law that had come to be recognized as binding only as a result of years of
use."1 The Harvard Research Draft authors found that five generally ac-
cepted principles had developed by which states could assert jurisdiction
over crimes occurring in part or in whole outside of their territories.12
The five principles which allow nations to exercise jurisdiction over
extraterritorial crimes are:
1) Territorial Jurisdiction - dependent upon the place where the offense is
committed.
2) National Jurisdiction - dependent upon the nationality of the offender.
3) Protective Jurisdiction - dependent upon whether the national interest
is injured.
4) Universal Jurisdiction - dependent upon whether the offense is of the
type considered particularly heinous and harmful to humanity, and if so,
jurisdiction is conferred to any forum that obtains physical custody of the
offender.
5) Passive Personality Jurisdiction - dependent upon the nationality of
the victim. 13
Of the five principles, jurisdiction based on Passive Personality has
consistently encountered the most resistance, both in the United States
and internationally. This resistance is reflected in United States domestic
law, in the conduct of United States foreign relations, and in the interna-
tional agreements that have been concluded concerning hijacking and re-
lated matters.
A. The Concept of Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction in the United
States: Avoidance of the Passive Personality Principle
In the United States, the Passive Personality principle has been least
relied upon by all branches of the United States government as a basis for
the extraterritorial projection of American authority and has been a par-
ticular source of controversy for the United States judiciary. 14
As early as 1887, in the Cutting case, 15 the executive branch an-
nounced that it did not concede to foreign governments any right to
prosecute American citizens for conduct by them affecting foreign na-
11. The principles in question were drawn from multilateral conventions (albeit few in
number), bilateral treaties and customary rules.
12. Harvard Research Draft at 439-442. The Harvard Research Draft defined a state'sjurisdiction as a state's competence under international law to prosecute and punish crimes.
Id. at 439.
13. Id. at 439.
14. "The passive personality theory of jurisdiction is generally considered to be
anathematic to United States law." Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and
Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crimes, 1984 UTAH L. REv. 685, 715.
15. 1887 PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 751,
reprinted in 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 228-40 (1906).
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tionals but occurring wholly in the United States. 16 Reciprocally, the
United States has generally committed itself to refraining from prosecut-
ing foreign nationals for conduct occurring wholly outside the United
States which has affected American citizens abroad. This is reflected in
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, which explicitly rejects the Passive Personality theory of
jurisdiction. 17
The tenor of early twentieth century American judicial attitudes con-
cerning the Passive Personality principle is captured by Judge Moore's
dissenting opinion in the Lotus case.18 The Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice narrowly held that Turkey had the right to apply its crimi-
nal law to a French naval officer even though the officer had been on his
own French ship, outside Turkish territorial waters, when it collided
with a Turkish vessel, causing the death of eight Turkish nationals. In
dissent, Judge Moore argued that a nation had no right to reach outside
of its territory to punish a foreign national in this way:
[This principle is] at variance not only with the principle of the exclusive
jurisdiction of a state over its own territory, but also with the equally well-
settled principle that a person visiting a foreign country, far from radiating
for his protection the jurisdiction of his own country, falls under the domin-
ion of the local law and, except so far as his government may diplomatically
intervene in case of a denial of justice, must look to that law for his
protection. 19
Recently, United States courts have recognized the Passive Personality
principle in a few criminal cases. Without exception, however, there
have been either extenuating circumstances or one of the other four prin-
ciples has been primarily relied upon.
In United States v. Layton,20 the court recognized that Congress'
power to authorize extraterritorial jurisdiction over the crimes allegedly
16. Id. at 755, reprinted in 2 J. MOORE, supra note 15, at 237. In Cutting, a United States
citizen had published an allegedly libelous statement regarding a Mexican national. The state-
ment was published in a Texas newspaper. Therefore, it was intended for circulation only in
the United States, and, presumably, it was never circulated in Mexico. Upon his subsequent
voluntary entry into Mexico, Cutting was arrested by Mexican authorities for the publication
of the allegedly defamatory statements.
17. Section 402 states:
A state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching a legal consequence
to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground that the conduct affects
one of its nationals.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1987).
18. S.S. Lotus Case (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A.) No. 10 (Sept. 7) [hereinafter
Lotus].
19. Id. at 92 (Moore, J., dissenting).
20. 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981).
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committed by Layton rested on four of the five jurisdictional principles,
namely, the Protective, Territorial, Nationality, and Passive Personality
principles. Layton's primary defense was that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the charges. He contended that the events on
which the charges were based all occurred outside the territorial limits of
the United States.
It may be recalled that this case stemmed from the so-called "Jones-
town mass-suicide." Laurence J. Layton was indicted on four criminal
counts arising from the events which occurred at the Port Kaituma air-
port in Guyana in November 18, 1978. Those events resulted in the
death of Congressman Leo J. Ryan, a member of the United States
House of Representatives, and the wounding of Richard Dwyer, the
Deputy Chief of Missions for the United States in the Republic of
Guyana. Layton was charged with conspiracy to murder a congressman,
aiding and abetting in the murder of a congressman, conspiracy to mur-
der an internationally protected person, and aiding and abetting -in the
attempted murder of an internationally protected person.21
The Layton court conceded that the Passive Personality principle, in
and of itself, is not a sufficient basis for asserting extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion.22 However, the court declined to address the validity of the Passive
Personality principle and instead relied on the authority provided by the
three other principles to hold that the court did have jurisdiction over
Layton.23
Three years later, in United States v. Benitez,24 the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that Congress would have intended for the victim's nationality
to be a sufficient basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction if the victim was an
United States government official. Benitez involved charges of conspir-
acy to murder Drug Enforcement Administration agents engaged in per-
forming their official duties, of assaulting agents with deadly weapons
while they were performing official duties, and of robbing agents of offi-
cial United States passports and their Drug Enforcement Administration
21. Id at 214.
22. Id. at 216 n.5. The court acknowledged that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 30(2) disapproved of allowing the Pas-
sive Personality principle, standing alone, to provide jurisdiction. However, the court went on
to state that:
Given that the assertion of passive personality jurisdiction does not stand alone in this
case as the sole basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction under recognized principles of inter-
national law, the court need not address the question of whether Congress could assert itsjurisdiction over a crime merely on the basis of the nationality of the victim.
Id.
23. Id. at 216.
24. 741 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1137 (1985).
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credentials. 25 The defendant was a Colombian national and the alleged
crimes occurred in Colombia. The nature of the crimes indicate that
they were directed at the victims specifically because of their nationality.
One of the main issues on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit was Benitez's
contention that the district court had no jurisdiction to try him because
he was not a United States citizen and because the underlying acts oc-
curred in Colombia.26
The circuit court concluded that the district court's power to try Beni-
tez rested on both the Protective principle and the Passive Personality
principle. The circuit court relied almost exclusively on the Protective
principle, however, citing the threat to United States interests posed by
acts such as those Benitez committed.27 Thus, as in Layton, the Eleventh
Circuit avoided addressing directly the issue of whether the Passive Per-
sonality principle is competent to stand alone.
In United States v. Columba-Colella,28 the Fifth Circuit unequivocally
denied that the Passive Personality principle is competent to stand alone.
In Columba-Colella, a Mexican national had agreed to fence a car stolen
from a United States citizen by a United States citizen. The only connec-
tion between the alleged crime and the United States was the citizenship
of the victim, the car's owner.29 In denying extraterritorial jurisdiction
to the court, the Fifth Circuit analogized United States jurisdiction over
a stolen car sale to United States jurisdiction over pickpocketing in
Acapulco involving American victims. 30 Congress would not be compe-
tent to prohibit such conduct. Nor would United States courts have ju-
risdiction to enforce such a prohibition were the offender in their control.
Writing for the Fifth Circuit, Judge Wisdom stated emphatically that
an "act affect[ing] the citizen of a state is not a sufficient basis for that
state to assert jurisdiction over the act.' ' 31 He held, therefore, that the
district court did not have jurisdiction over Columba-Colella, even
though an American citizen had been victimized.
25. Id. at 1313.
26. Id. at 1316.
27. Id at 1317 ("We hold that assault and attempted murder of DEA agents is exactly the
type of crime that Congress must have intended to apply extraterritorially."). See also Layton,
509 F. Supp. at 217.
28. 604 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1979).
29. Id at 357.
30. Id at 360. The opinion went so far as to state that Congress would not be competent
to attach criminal sanctions to the murder of an American by a foreign national in a foreign
country, even if the victim returned home and succumbed to his injuries. Id.
31. Id.
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B. The Concept of Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction in
Conventions Related to Terrorism
The increase in worldwide terrorism has presented challenges to long-
standing traditions of international law, particularly with respect to juris-
dictional issues. To address the scourge of terrorism, the world commu-
nity has entered into several conventions which deal with the special
problems of jurisdiction in respect to offenses committed on board air-
craft in flight.32
The Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Commit-
ted on Board Aircraft of 196333 was the first significant multilateral at-
tempt to deal with these problems. This convention primarily sought to
codify existing customary law providing jurisdiction to the state of regis-
tration of the aircraft even though the offense did not occur within that
state's territory. The Tokyo Convention dealt only in a limited way with
hijackers. It enabled hijackers to be taken into custody or subjected to
restraint in the same manner as other offenders. It provided for restora-
tion of control of the hijacked aircraft to its lawful commander and for
the continuance of the journey of the passengers and crew.34
As the number and severity of international hijackings increased, it
became necessary for the international community to deal specifically
with the hijacking problem. A first effort at this was the Hague Conven-
tion for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, to which over
100 hundred countries became signatories on December 16, 1970. 35 The
Hague Convention called on contracting states to make the offense of
hijacking punishable by severe penalties and to take measures to establish
32. According to D.W. Greig:
The term convention is really just another word for a treaty. Indeed, the expression
treaty is used as a generic term to cover a multitude of international agreements often
referred to by a confusing variety of names. Some treaties are called treaties, but others
are termed conventions or protocols, declarations, charters, covenants, or pacts; some-
times a treaty is referred to as an agreement, but on other occasions-as a modus vivendi,
an exchange of notes, or a memorandum of agreement.
Whatever the term used, the agreement must have certain characteristics:
(i) it should be in writing;
(ii) it must be an agreement between entities with international personality;
(iii) it must be governed by international law; and
(iv) it must create a legal obligation.
D. GREIG, supra note 9, at 356.
33. Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Tokyo Con-
vention]. The text of this convention can also be found in 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 566 (1964).
34. J. STARKE, supra note 8, at 229.
35. Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970,
22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. The
text of this convention can also be found in 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 440 (1971).
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jurisdiction over the offense and related acts of violence against passen-
gers and crew members. Although the Hague Convention certainly went
further than the Tokyo Convention in recognizing the special jurisdic-
tional problems presented by hijacking, it did not resolve the conflict
presented by the various nations' application of their domestic criminal
laws.3
6
In September 1971, the Hague Convention was supplemented by the
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation.37 Because the occurrence of violent acts on
board aircraft had increased in scope and severity, the Montreal Conven-
tion did not limit its application to acts of seizure of aircraft in flight as
the Hague Convention had done. The provisions of the Montreal Con-
vention expanded the applicable offenses.38 In addition, the Montreal
Convention expanded the situs of the offense to include not only a plane
in the air, but also a plane on the ground at any time from the moment
when all of its external doors are closed following embarkation until the
moment when any such door is opened for disembarkation.3 9
36. 1. STARKE, supra note 8, at 228.
37. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Montreal
Convention]. The text of this convention can also be found in 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 455 (1972).
38. Article I of the Montreal Convention provides that:
1. Any person commits an offense if he unlawfully and intentionally:
(a) performs an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if that act
is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; or
(b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft which renders it
incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or
(c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a
device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which
renders it incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety
in flight; or
(d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their operation, if
any such act is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight; or
(e) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the
safety of an aircraft in flight.
Id. at 565.
39. Article 2 of the Montreal Convention states:
For purposes of this Convention:
(a) an aircraft is considered to be in flight at any time from the moment when all its
external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment when any such door is
opened for disembarkation; in the case of a forced landing, the flight shall be deemed to
continue until the competent authorities take over the responsibility for the aircraft and
for persons and property on board;
(b) an aircraft is considered to be in service from the beginning of the preflight prepara-
tion of the aircraft by ground personnel or by the crew for a specific flight until twenty-
four hours after any landing; the period of service shall, in any event, extend for the entire
period during which the aircraft is in flight as defined in paragraph (a) of this article.
Id.
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These conventions provide a comprehensive and necessary definition
of hijacking4° and give jurisdiction over the offense to each contracting
state. The operative jurisdictional principle throughout the three con-
ventions, however, is not the Passive Personality principle; it is the
Universality principle. Hijacking is labeled a crime against humanity,
and therefore any state which obtains custody over an offender is entitled
to assert jurisdiction. Only article 4(b) of the Tokyo Convention men-
tions the Passive Personality principle as a jurisdictional basis.4 1 This
article, however, actually authorizes assertion of jurisdiction based on
either the Nationality principle (in the event the offender is a national of
the contracting state) or the Passive Personality principle (in the event
the victim is a national of the contracting state). Furthermore, since it is
the only article which relies solely on the nationality of the victim, absent
any other nexus to the contracting state, it is unclear whether article 4(b)
was ever intended to stand on its own.
The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,42 par-
ent of the American Hostage Taking Act, addresses the problem of nexus
for the purpose of jurisdiction. Article 5(1)(d), the jurisdictional state-
ment, provides for Passive Personality jurisdiction, but only where ap-
propriate: "Each State Party shall take such measures as may be
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over any of the offenses set forth in
article 1 which are committed ... with respect to a hostage who is a
national of that State, if that State considers it appropriate . . . . -43 It
seems clear from this use of language that the Hostage Taking Conven-
tion intends to provide for the exercise of Passive Personality jurisdiction
only where reasonable, that is, only where a sufficient nexus exists be-
tween a hostage-taking incident and a nation's interests. Clearly, hos-
tage-taking incidents are not all alike. An American held hostage as a
member of a diverse group, for example, is an altogether different state of
affairs from a situation in which an individual American is kidnapped,
40. Article 1 of the Hague Convention provides a succinct definition of hijacking:
Any person who on board an aircraft in flight: (a) unlawfully, by force or threat
thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft,
or attempts to perform any such act, or (b) is an accomplice of a person who performs or
attempts to perform any such act, commits an offense.
Hague Convention, supra note 35, at 1641.
41. Article 4(b) of the Tokyo Convention states in pertinent part:
A Contracting State which is not the State of registration may not interfere with an
aircraft in flight in order to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over an offense committed on
board except in the following cases: ... (b) the offense has been committed by or against a
national or permanent resident of such State.
Tokyo Convention, supra note 33, at 2941.
42. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, supra note 4.
43. Id. at art. 5.
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draped in an American flag, and required to read political announce-
ments on videotape.
That the framers of the Convention did not intend unrestricted exer-
cise of Passive Personality jurisdiction is also apparent from article 14.
Mindful of the supreme sovereignty of state parties, article 14 specifies
that:
Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as justifying the violation of
territorial integrity or political independence of a State in contravention of
the Charter of the United Nations.44
Thus, even if the United States felt justified to assert jurisdiction under
article 5(l)(d), article 14 contradicts this justification by, at least theoreti-
cally, prohibiting the exercise of jurisdiction if the offense occurred
within another country's territory, notwithstanding that other country's
inability to prosecute.
A full five years passed from the opening of the Hostage Taking Con-
vention to the commencement of Congressional hearings on implement-
ing the Convention. 45 The prepared statement of Victoria Toensing,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, indicates the urgency with which
the Justice Department viewed the legislation. In calling upon Congress
to pass the Hostage Taking Act, the Deputy Assistant stressed that:
The need for passing this legislation goes beyond filling.., gaps in our
present law. Its passage will send an international message of the United
States' commitment to combat terrorism. Our failure to implement the
Montreal Convention has been an impediment to our diplomatic efforts to
encourage further concerted international action against terrorism.46
The tone of Toensing's statement indicates recognition by the executive
branch that United States domestic law must not only be in compliance
with international law but that the United States must look to its treaty
commitments to define its domestic law. Specifically with regard to the
question of extraterritorial jurisdiction, Toensing stressed that the Justice
Department "does not intend to assume jurisdiction where there is no
compelling federal interest." 47 But what constitutes a compelling federal
interest? Significantly, of the 6,500 incidents classified as terrorist acts
between 1973 and 1982, only 38 percent were directed at United States
44. Id. at art. 14.
45. The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Committee on the Judici-
ary, commenced three days of hearings on Tuesday, June 5, 1984. Legislative Initiatives to
Curb Domestic and International Terrorism: Hearings on S. 2470, S. 2624, S. 2625, and S.
2626 Before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Legislative Initiatives].
46. Id. at 48.
47. Id. at 49.
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interests.48 In 1983, there were approximately 500 terrorist incidents,
with over 50 percent directed at United States interests.49 More often
than not, countries other than the United States are the target of terrorist
attack.
In sum, international law as codified by the Harvard Research Draft
does provide limited acceptance of the Passive Personality principle, and
this limited acceptance is reflected in treaties providing for the reasonable
exercise of Passive Personality jurisdiction. However, the record reveals
that United States courts have generally been unwilling to assert jurisdic-
tion based upon the Passive Personality principle alone, and Congress
has chosen not to overstep the limited role given the Passive Personality
principle in international law.
III. United States v. Yunis: A Dangerous Precedent
Displaying a show of force usually reserved for a prelude to battle, the
FBI engaged a rented yacht, a naval munitions ship assigned to the
United States Sixth Fleet, an aircraft carrier, and a twin-engine S3 air-
craft to conduct the arrest of Fawaz Yunis in the Mediterranean Sea.50
The arrest, code-named operation "Goldenrod," 51 was the culmination
of more than two years of searching for the ringleader of the group re-
sponsible for hijacking a Jordanian airliner.5 2
Although the FBI had begun its search for Yunis shortly after he and
his co-hijackers escaped into the Beirut suburbs, Yunis had eluded his
pursuers. Operation "Goldenrod" gained momentum only after the FBI
secured the assistance of a one-time friend of Yunis, Jamal Hamdan, who
had turned government informant. 53 Desperately short of funds, Yunis
was perfect prey for the sting operation set up between the FBI and
Hamdan. 54 In Lebanon, Hamdan, acting on the direction of the FBI,
promised Yunis substantial proceeds from a drug deal that the two
would consummate with wealthy international dealers on a yacht in the
Mediterranean.55 According to the Government, the operation went
smoothly from the moment Yunis stepped on the yacht to when, five
48. Id. at 59-61.
49. Id. at 61.
50. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 912 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
51. Id. at 911.
52. L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
53. 681 F. Supp. at 912; N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1987, at A3, col. 3.
54. 859 F.2d at 955. Government's Omnibus Response to Defendant's Pretrial Motions at
6, United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909.
55. Id.
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days later, the aircraft transporting him from the Mediterranean landed
at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland.5 6
The case came before the District Court for the District of Columbia
five months after Yunis' arrest.57 The counts originally lodged against
Yunis fell into three jurisdictional areas. First, Yunis was charged "with
conspiracy to commit hostage-taking against passengers and crew, to
damage, destroy, disable and place destructive devices aboard an aircraft,
and to perform acts of violence against passengers and crew in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1203, 32(a)(1), (2) and (5)."58 Second, Yunis was
charged with "seizing, detaining and threatening passengers and crew
members, including three American nationals as hostages, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1203." 59 Third, counts II, IV, and V of the indictment
charged Yunis with "damaging, destroying, disabling and placing a de-
structive device upon an aircraft operating in foreign air commerce and
committing acts of violence against aircraft personnel in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 32 (a)(1), (2), and (5). " 60
This multi-count indictment was filed September 15, 1987, the day of
Yunis' arrest. Upon Yunis' incarceration in the United States, the Gov-
ernment entered a superseding indictment on October 1, 1987 adding
additional counts. 61 Counts VI, VII, VIII and IX charged Yunis with
"damaging, destroying and placing a destructive device on an aircraft
registered in a foreign country and harming aircraft personnel, in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. §§ 32 (b)(1), (2) and (3) and 49 U.S.C. App.
§ 1472(n)(1)." 62 The nature of Yunis' offense and his subsequent arrest
raised two important issues. First, did the United States have statutory
authority to assert jurisdiction over an alien who committed an act on
foreign soil? Second, did asserting jurisdiction over Yunis violate inter-
national law since the United States was clearly exercising jurisdiction
beyond its territorial boundaries? In addressing the first issue of domes-
tic statutory authority, the district court relied on the jurisdictional pro-
visions of both the Hostage Taking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1), and
the Destruction of Aircraft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 32(a), (b).63
56. 681 F. Supp. at 912.
57. The precise date is February 12, 1988. Yunis was incarcerated in Washington, D.C.
while awaiting trial.
58. 681 F. Supp. at 898.
59. Id
60. Id.
61. Id.; N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1987, at A27, col. 6.
62. 681 F. Supp. at 898.
63. Id. at 904-09.
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A. Did the United States Have Statutory Authority to Assert
Jurisdiction Over Yunis?
In applying the Hostage Taking statute, the court found that the lan-
guage of the statute unambiguously granted the United States extraterri-
torial jurisdiction because there had been three American nationals on
board the Jordanian flight. In fact, Judge Barrington Parker refused to
consider whether Congress had actually intended not to extend extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction over offenses where the only nexus to the United
States was the presence of American nationals." Quoting the stand of
the District of Columbia Circuit on legislative history, he stated:
[I]t is elementary in the law of statutory construction that, absent ambigu-
ity or unreasonable result, the literal language of the statute controls and
resort to legislative history is not only unnecessary but improper. 65
Conversely, in the case of United States v. Bowman, 66 where three
American defendants and one British defendant were accused of de-
frauding the United States government in a scheme involving a wholly-
owned United States company in Brazil, the Supreme Court rejected the
notion that Congress' intent in enacting the criminal appeals statute in
question was not a relevant factor in determining whether extraterritorial
jurisdiction applied.67 Stating in dicta that Congress must explicitly de-
fine the locus of a crime for a statute to apply, and if punishment of
"crimes against private individuals or their property" is to be extended
extraterritorially Congress must so state, the Court held that such strict
guidelines need not apply to all criminal statutes. 68 Chief Justice Taft,
writing for the Court, stated:
[T]he same [strict] rule of interpretation should not be applied to criminal
statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for
the Government's jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the
Government to defend itself against obstruction or fraud wherever perpe-
trated, especially if committed by its own citizens, officers, or agents. 69
The Supreme Court's rationale was that in such cases, although Congress
had not provided specifically for extraterritorial reach of the criminal
64. Id Yunis' counsel argued that Congress did not intend to extend jurisdiction merely
on the grounds that American nationals were seized.
65. Id at 904 (citing Eagle Picher Industries Inc. v. E.P.A., 759 F.2d 922, 929 n. 11 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) quoting Montgomery Charter Serv. Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Comm'n, 325 F.2d 230, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1963)).
66. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
67. Id. at 102.
68. Id. at 98.
69. Id. at 98.,
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law, extraterritorial reach was "to be inferred from the nature of the
offense." 70
However, there is no indication that the offense of hostage-taking is in
that special class of cases that by their very nature must imply extraterri-
torial jurisdiction.71 Actually, in discussing the Aircraft Sabotage Act,
Senator Thurmond emphasized that the Act provided jurisdiction either
in "those rare instances where the alleged offender would still be on
board the aircraft when it lands in the United States, as well as those
instances where the offender would subsequently enter the United States
and be found here."' 72
In applying the Destruction of Aircraft statute, the Yunis court found
it necessary to dissect the two operative subsections. Subsection 32(a)
applies to offenses committed against "any aircraft in the special aircraft
jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft'used, operated, or
employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce. ' 73 Subsection
32(b) applies to acts of violence against any individual on board "any
civil aircraft registered in a country other than the United States ... if
the offender is later found in the United States."'74 Yunis was charged
pursuant to both subsections - 32(a) because the Jordanian airliner was
used in foreign air commerce and 32(b) because he was allegedly found
in the United States.75 The court rejected the Government's argument
that subsection 32(a) applied.76 The Government contended that be-
cause the American citizens on board the Jordanian airliner must have
departed from the United States some time in the past, any flight they
boarded in the future, including this particular Jordanian airliner, could
be considered in the stream of "foreign air commerce" for purposes of
liability pursuant to subsection 32(a).77 The court declined to find that
70. Id. (emphasis in original).
71. In Bowman, the very crimes with which the defendants were charged - conspiracy to
defraud the corporation in which the United States was a stockholder, and conspiracy on the
ship, on the high seas and at the port of Rio de Janeiro as well as in the city, in violation of
§ 35 of the Criminal Code - led the Court to the conclusion that "it would be going too far to
say that because Congress did not fix any locus, it intended to exclude the high seas in respect
of this crime. The natural inference from the character of the offense is that the sea would be a
probable place for its commission." Id. at 99.
72. S. REP. No. 619, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1984) (Senator Strom Thurmond reporting
from the Committee on the Judiciary on the Aircraft Sabotage Act) (emphasis added).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 32(a) (1988). Note that 32(a) applies not only to United States aircraft,
but also to any aircraft departing from the United States.
74. Id. § 32(b) (emphasis added).
75. 681 F. Supp. at 905-907 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 907.
77. Id.
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Congress has the ability to regulate foreign commerce having so attenu-
ated a relationship to the United States.78
With respect to subsection 32(b), the court faced a tougher jurisdic-
tional question. Attached to 32(b) is the qualifier that the offender must
later be found in the United States. The Government, which had pre-
pared the indictment against Yunis long before his apprehension, had
intentionally postponed filing counts VI, VII, VIII, and IX, based on
violation of subsection 32(b), until after the arrest on board the yacht in
the Mediterranean. 79 Thus, cognizant of the fact that it could only
charge Yunis with violation of subsection 32(b) if he were later found in
the United States, the Government planned his capture and then, as soon
as he was within United States jurisdiction at Andrews Air Force Base,
asserted jurisdiction on the basis that Yunis was later found in the
United States.
The process of charging Yunis involved first indicting him under the
Hostage Taking statute. which does not require physical presence in the
United States in order to exercise subject matter jurisdiction, and then,
after his capture and abduction to the United States, charging him with
violating the Aircraft Destruction statute. Instead of providing a defini-
tive interpretation of the term "found," the court embraced the Govern-
ment's argument that the term "found" is neither defined in the statute
nor explained in the legislative history.80 Further, the court concluded
that the statute "neither precludes nor approves the extension of jurisdic-
tion over offenders who have been brought to this country by force." 81 It
seems inconsistent for the Yunis court to hold the legislative history of
the Hostage Taking Act to be "unnecessary and improper" in regard to
Yunis' claim that the Hostage Taking Act was not intended to assert
jurisdiction solely on the nationality of the victims,8 2 and then turn about
face and take comfort in the Government's argument that "the legislative
history and purpose behind the [Destruction of Aircraft] statute support
extending jurisdiction over the defendant. '83
78. As the court noted:
Rather than relying on Congress's direct authority under Art. I Section 8 to define and
punish offenses against the law of nations, the government contends that Congress has
authority to regulate global air commerce under the Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art
I, § 8, cl. 3. But Congress is not empowered to regulate foreign commerce which has no
connection to the United States.
Id. at 907 n.24.
79. Id. at 898; N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1987, at A27, col 6.
80. 681 F. Supp. at 906.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 904. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
83. 681 F. Supp. at 906.
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B. Did Asserting Jurisdiction Over Yunis Violate International Law?
The second critical issue raised in Yunis concerned whether assertion
of jurisdiction by the United States violated international law. Conced-
ing the importance of international law, the court stated that "the gov-
ernment cannot act beyond the jurisdictional parameters set forth by
principles of international law and domestic statute."'8 4 What then are
the principles of international law that the court was forced to consider?
The court limited its discussion to the Universality principle and the Pas-
sive Personality principle and found that the United States had subject
matter jurisdiction under both principles.85
In addressing the Universality principle, the court found extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction existed on the basis that Yunis' offenses of hostage-taking
and destruction of aircraft were of such a heinous nature that they pro-
vided the United States with the requisite jurisdiction to prosecute and
punish the offender on behalf of the world community,8 6 notwithstanding
that Yunis was not a United States citizen and that the offense was perpe-
trated outside United States territory. The court cited several authorities
and international treaties 87 in order to support its position that Yunis'
offenses were hosti humani generis and that, therefore, the United States
was justified in asserting jurisdiction under the Universality theory. 88
84. Id.
85. 681 F. Supp. at 903 ("Thus the Universal and Passive Personality principles, together,
provide ample grounds for this Court to assert jurisdiction over Yunis.").
86. Id at 901. In fact, the court quoted an excerpt from the President's Message to Con-
gress on the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages in support of the notion
that the very purpose behind the Hostage Taking Act was "to demonstrate to other govern-
ments and international forums that the United States is serious about its efforts to deal with
international terrorism." President's Message to Congress on the International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 590, 592 (Apr. 26, 1984),
cited in 681 F. Supp. at 905.
87. 681 F. Supp. at 900-01. The court cited art. 4, § 2 of the Hague Convention and art. 5,
§ 2 of the Montreal Convention as evidence that each contracting party is mandated to "take
such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses.., where the
alleged offender is present in its territory." Id. at 900. The court chose to focus on the issue of
whether aircraft piracy and hostage-taking fit within the category of "heinous" offenses for
purposes of satisfying the definition of the Universality principle. In support of the court's
position that these offenses do meet the criterion of "heinous," the court cited 2 M. BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 31-32 (ed. 1986) and Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d
571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985). Id. at 900-01. The court characterized Demjanjuk as holding that
the "[t]reaty against genocide signed by a significant number of states made that crime hei-
nous; therefore Israel had proper jurisdiction over nazi (sic) war criminal under the Universal
principle." Id. at 900.
88. Id. at 901. Further, the court cited to the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 744 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985), as
establishing "that the Universal principle, standing alone, provides sufficient basis for asserting
jurisdiction over an alleged offender." 681 F. Supp. at 901. In fact, the court in Tel-Oren
refused to find jurisdiction based on the Universality principle. 726 F.2d at 744 (1984).
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The court had greater difficulty in concluding that the Passive Person-
ality principle applied. It conceded that the Passive Personality principle
has historically been the most controversial of the theories justifying the
application of extraterritorial jurisdiction.8 9 However, the court drew
the conclusion that since the Hostage Taking Act provides that a state
may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over a non-national 90 who com-
mits an offense against a national if that state considers it appropriate,
then the Passive Personality principle must be allowed to apply.91 The
court found the Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law's ad-
monition against the invocation of the Passive Personality principle no
longer controlling.92 It cited the reporter's notes to the Tentative Draft
No. 6, which acknowledge that the principle has been increasingly ac-
cepted when applied to terrorist and other organized attacks on a state's
nationals by reason of their nationality. 93 The court conveniently ig-
nored the fact that there has not been one single case in which United
States courts have successfully asserted jurisdiction based on the Passive
Personality principle alone.
The court alluded to United States v. Benitez 94 in search of support for
asserting jurisdiction on the basis of the Passive Personality principle
against aliens committing crimes against United States nationals over-
seas.95 What the court failed to elucidate, however, is that the control-
ling jurisdictional factor in Benitez was the official status of the victims.
Indeed, in Benitez, the court stated:
In resolving this issue, it is important that the crimes for which Benitez has
been convicted- were assault upon United States DEA agents, attempted
murder of United States DEA agents, and theft of United States govern-
ment property. Given the nature of the offenses and the identity of the
victims, we conclude that the district court had jurisdiction to try and con-
vict Benitez. 96
89. Id. at 902 ("Defendant's counsel correctly notes that the Passive Personal[ity] princi-
ple traditionally has been an anathema to United States lawmakers.").
90. Hostage Taking Act, supra note 4, at art. 5(l)(a), (d).
91. 681 F. Supp. at 902 ("Therefore, even if there are doubts regarding the international
community's acceptance [of the Passive Personality principle], there can be no doubt concern-
ing the application of this principle to the offense of hostage taking, an offense for which Yunis
is charged.").
92. Id.
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 (1987). For the text of this section, see supra note 17.
94. 741 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1984).
95. 681 F. Supp. at 902 n.12.
96. 741 F.2d at 1316.
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Although the Benitez court relied on both the Protective principle and
the Passive Personality principle for conferring jurisdiction,97 the court
could have relied exclusively on the Protective principle. In Benitez,
United States interests and integrity were at stake. These interests were
highlighted by the DEA status of the victims. Indeed, the case revealed
that the DEA agents were not fortuitously victimized, but were selected
specifically because of the perceived threat of United States law enforce-
ment methods to the drug dealers in Colombia.
In sum, the court in Yunis held that under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1203 and
32(b), the United States has jurisdiction over a foreign defendant absent
any nexus to the United States other than the presence of three Ameri-
cans on a hijacked foreign airliner and even though the defendant's entry
into the United States is forced, not voluntary.
IV. Analysis: The Need For a Weightier Nexus
Because Royal Jordanian Airlines Flight 402 was not bound for the
United States, had not departed from the United States, never flew over
the United States, was not registered in the United States, and did not
have the outward appearance of a United States plane,98 the critical issue
is whether the United States should have maintained jurisdiction over
Fawaz Yunis.
While the United States may espouse the noble ideal of showing the
world that it is tough on terrorism,99 self-interest dictates that the United
States not allow its jurisdictional tentacles to reach so far. There are
compelling reasons for the United States to reject the Yunis court's reli-
ance on both the Passive Personality principle and the Universality prin-
ciple. These reasons may be captioned as follows: the danger of
provoking reciprocal conduct from unfriendly nations, the danger of set-
ting unsound precedent for other nations to follow, and respect for rela-
tions among nations.
A. The Specter of Reciprocal Conduct
It is not so farfetched to imagine the prospect of Iran dispatching intel-
ligence agents to the United States to capture United States military of-
97. Id.; see also Rivard v. Unit&d States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.) (U.S. court has jurisdic-
tion over aliens for conspiracy to smuggle heroin into U.S. where several of acts in furtherance
of conspiracy were committed within U.S.), cert. denied sub nom. Groleau v. United States,
389 U.S. 884 (1967).
98. 681 F. Supp. at 899. The Yunis court acknowledged that "the only nexus to the
United States was the presence of several American nationals on board the flight." Id.
99. See generally Legislative Initiatives, supra note 45; see also President's Message to Con-
gress Transmitting Four Proposed Bills, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 590 (Apr. 26, 1984).
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ficers for offenses against Iranian nationals stemming from the accidental
shooting down of an Iranian airbus over the Persian Gulf. When the
United States cries foul, an Iranian tribunal need only refer to the prece-
dent set by United States v. Yunis.
In an attempt to deal with the increasing frequency and violence of
international terrorism directed against American citizens abroad, Con-
gress has enacted a panoply of statutes. In 1984 Congress implemented
the Hostage Taking Act and the Aircraft Destruction Act. Two years
later Congress enacted the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterror-
ism Act of 1986.100
The Antiterrorism Act, unlike the Hostage Taking Act and the Air-
craft Destruction Act, was not introduced as enabling legislation seeking
to fulfill United States obligations pursuant to international treaties.101
According to its proponents, the very objectives sought to be achieved by
the Antiterrorism Act could best be served by providing that extraterri-
torial jurisdiction be extended on the basis of the Passive Personality
principle, oftentimes the Passive Personality principle standing alone.102
It has been argued that the Antiterrorism Act is a worthy extension of
United States jurisdiction over international crimes pursuant to the Pas-
sive Personality principle.10 3 It is claimed that all that would be neces-
sary to prevent damaging reciprocal conduct by foreign nations is for
Congress to amend the Antiterrorism Act to "contain a provision assert-
ing United States jurisdiction only in cases where the state with primary
jurisdiction refuses or fails to prosecute the accused."'10 4 It has been fur-
ther argued that with this limitation on the use of the Passive Personality
principle, coupled with a redefinition of "international terrorism" to re-
quire a heightened state of mind, "the United States can narrow the risk
100. The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 was codified at 18
U.S.C. § 2331 (1988) [hereinafter Antiterrorism Act]. It sought to provide punishment for
conduct resulting in homicide, attempt or conspiracy with respect to homicide, and physical
violence with intent to cause serious bodily injury. It is essential that the acts occur outside
United States territory and that there be victims who are United States nationals, as a national
is defined in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(1982).
101. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986), reprinted in 1989 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1865. The Conference Report indicates that the Senate
amendment to the Antiterrorism Act asked the President to call for international negotiations
to define international terrorist crimes and to determine whether such crimes would constitute
universal crimes under international law. Id at 86.
102. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(a) (1988) provides in pertinent part: "Homicide. - Whoever kills a
national of the United States, while such national is outside the United States, shall [be pun-
ished as provided under this title]." (emphasis supplied).
103. Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Acts of Terrorism Committed Abroad: Omni-
bus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 599, 616 (1987).
104. Id. at 617.
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of unwarranted reciprocal applications of the Passive Personality
principle."105
There are at least three problems with this proposition. The first prob-
lem is that the very countries who sponsor terrorism and who could
claim jurisdiction under the Nationality principle often choose not to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over their offending nationals. Often, these are the
very countries from which the United States has the most to fear in terms
of reciprocal conduct. As flawed as the proposition is, it appears to re-
flect the unrealistic view expressed in the prepared testimony of Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Toensing during the Hostage Taking Act
legislative hearings. In urging extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction,
Toensing stated:
Most perpetrators of hostage-taking outside of the United States will and
should be dealt with by the foreign government where the crime occurred.
This bill is written to create United States federal jurisdiction in the event
the perpetrator evades the jurisdiction of such court, or the court fails to
mete out justice in vindication of our interests.10 6
Toensing's comments raise still more concerns. Just what are our inter-
ests? Are three Americans on board a Jordanian airliner significant
enough to constitute "our interests" in order to warrant subjecting
America to reciprocal conduct? Exactly what justice must the other
country, with its own statutory structure reflecting different cultural
norms, mete out to vindicate United States interests? What if the coun-
try to whom most of the victims owe allegiance has not ratified the Hos-
tage Taking Convention so that its domestic law does not give it
jurisdiction over the offender?
The explosion in state-sponsored terrorism, primarily promulgated by
Syria, Iran, and Libya 0 7 makes a mockery of the proposition that these
countries will sponsor, fund and equip a terrorist activity, then subse-
105. Id. at 618.
106. Legislative Initiatives, supra note 45, at 49.
107. The Libyan-sponsored terrorist actions being perpetrated in the United States by Yu
Kikumura, a member of the Japanese Red Army, represent one example of terrorist activities
that are sponsored by these four states. Kikumura was arrested on April 12, 1988, by a state
trooper in New Jersey. In his possession, the police discovered three eighteen inch bombs
made of materials purchased in over 17 states and assembled in fire extinguisher casings. Po-
lice also found a map of New York City. Marked in pen on the map was a Navy recruiting
station on West 24th Street in Manhattan. According to law enforcement officials, his mission
was to detonate the bombs on August 14 as part of a plot seeking revenge for the U.S. air raid
against Libya. The explosion would occur exactly two years to the day from the American
attack. While Kikumura denied any ties to Libya or any other terrorist organization, wit-
nesses identified him as having participated in terrorist activities in Lebanon and Syria. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 4, 1989, at 30, col. 6; id., Feb. 8, 1989, at B2, col. 1.
On the expected day of the bombing, another bomb was detonated in Naples, Italy. The
bomb destroyed an American U.S.O. club, killing five people including a U.S. serviceman. As
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quently mete out justice against those very groups or individuals impli-
cated in the terrorist act.
The second flaw with the proposition to extend United States jurisdic-
tion to crimes committed abroad pursuant to the Passive Personality
principle is that oftentimes the government with primary jurisdiction
under the Nationality principle is in such a state of anarchy and disarray
that in effect there is no government. Such is the case currently in Leba-
non. The volatile nature of politics in the Middle East makes it ex-
tremely unrealistic to assume that a country such as Lebanon will assert
jurisdiction. 108
Furthermore, article 8 of the Hostage Taking Convention, requiring
the state in which the offender is found without exception either to extra-
dite or prosecute him, whether the offense was committed in its territory
or not, is applicable only between states that are parties to the Conven-
tion. 10 9 Since Lebanon is not a party to the Convention,110 and no extra-
dition treaty exists between the United States and Lebanon, I the United
States cannot rely on Lebanon's failure to extradite Yunis in order to
justify the extraordinary apprehension of Yunis.
In addition, a proposal that would trigger jurisdiction based on the
Passive Personality principle would engender animosity when no extradi-
a result of this bombing, another member of the Japanese Red Army, Junzo Okudaira, was
arrested. Id., Feb. 4, 1989, at 30, col. 6.
See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1989, at B2, col. 2 (reporting that Syria helped train
Kikumura); N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1989, at Al, col. 4 (suggesting that Hezbollah and Pro-
Iranian groups were involved in murder of Col. Higgins); Smith, Hunted By An Angry Faith,
TIME, Feb. 27, 1989, at 28 (discussing Iranian threat against Salman Rushdie).
108. To illustrate, even before Syrian intervention into Lebanon during the beginnings of
civil strife in 1976, Lebanon had maintained a government divided along religious lines. The
result was that different groups with equal power in the government owed allegiance to com-
peting outside nations. These divided allegiances made it extremely difficult for the Lebanese
government to try one of its nationals charged with a terrorist act. See generally N. WEIN-
BERGER, SYRIAN INTERVENTION IN LEBANON: THE 1975-1976 CIVIL WAR (1986).
Indeed, when he first received news of Yunis' capture, Lebanese Justice Minister Nabih
Berri denounced the seizure of Yunis as "an act close to piracy" and vowed that the Lebanese
would "find out the circumstances involved before taking the necessary measures to defend a
Lebanese citizen." N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1987, at A3, col. 3. Subsequently, however, when
confronted with Yunis' testimony that Berri had actually been behind the Jordanian Airlines
seizure, Berri withdrew support for Yunis and claimed Yunis' comments were "fabricated by
the Israeli and American intelligence." N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1987, at A12, col. 3.
109. In INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL LAW, J.G. Starke notes that "the mere fact
that there are a large number of parties to a multilateral convention does not mean that its
provision are of the nature of international law, binding non-parties. Generally speaking, non-
parties must by their conduct distinctly evidence an intention to accept such provision as gen-
eral rules of international law." J. STARKE, supra note 8, at 43.
110. Lebanon was not a signatory to the Convention, nor has it acceded to the Convention
in the interim.
111. No extradition treaty existed between the United States and Lebanon at the time of
the Jordanian airliner hijacking, and none has gone into effect in the interim.
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tion treaty exists between the requesting state and the state of nationality
of the offender. Once again, the very countries from whom the United
States has the most to fear in terms of damaging reciprocal conduct are
those nations with whom the United States has no extradition treaties.
The third flaw with the proposition invokes a discussion of the Univer-
sality principle. The foundation of the Universality principle is a global
acceptance that an offense is of such a heinous nature that no state can
condone it, and all states are encouraged to punish the offenders. 112 A
comprehensive definition of terrorism has eluded world representatives
since acts of violence against airline passengers emerged on the world
stage. This lack of consensus on the definition of terrorism, 13 despite the
need for its suppression, has led to a stalemate in the search for a conven-
tion dealing with terrorism as terrorism and not in its alternative forms
of hijacking, aircraft piracy, and hostage-taking.
Indeed, it is possible to grasp the difficulty of labeling any offense as
universally condemned when one regards the relatively small number of
countries which have ratified recent conventions. Although several trea-
ties have already made international crimes out of offenses involving in-
ternationally protected persons,114 civil aviation,115 and hostage-
taking, 116 the universal application of those treaties, as evidenced by the
number of countries ratifying them, is a different story. 117 Alarmingly,
despite worldwide concern for the growth in terrorism, only 54 states
have ratified the Hostage Taking Convention." t8 The United Nations
lists 159 member states and 11 non-member states on its roster. If only
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 articulates the Universality principle as follows:
A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized
by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks
on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism,
even where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is present.
113. Note, Extradition in an Era of Terrorism: The Need to Abolish the Political Offense
Exception, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 654, 687 (1986).
114. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No.
8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the
Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that Are of International Significance,
Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 255 (1971).
115. Tokyo Convention, supra note 33; Hague Convention, supra note 35; Montreal Con-
vention, supra note 37.
116. Hostage Taking Convention, supra note 4.
117. In the twenty-seven years that have elapsed since the Tokyo Convention was enacted,
124 countries have ratified the Tokyo Convention. However, as of mid-1989, only 80 countries
had ratified the Hague Convention, and only 93 countries had ratified the Montreal
Convention.
118. M. BOWMAN & D. HARRIS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX & CURRENT STA-
TUS 142 (6th ed. Supp. 1989).
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54 states have passed legislation recognizing the Hostage Taking Con-
vention, that represents barely one-third of all United Nations member
states. Referring once again to Yunis, there is real cause for concern that
the court upheld the use of the Hostage Taking Act to provide subject
matter jurisdiction when less than one-third of the nations of the world
have ratified the Convention supporting that Act.
It is important to note that the act of hostage-taking is simple to de-
fine. The taking of hostages as defined in article 1 of the Hostage Taking
Convention is a patently discernible event. As long as an individual has
physically seized another individual, and as long as the seizing individual
has articulated his desire to compel any third party to do or abstain from
doing any act, he has committed the offense of hostage-taking. The acts
of seizing and articulating demands are visible acts, not requiring any
inquiry into the offender's motives. On the other hand, states must re-
solve several pivotal issues before terrorism can truly fall under the
Universality principle. Some of these issues are whether to include gov-
ernmental, state-sponsored, acts as well as private acts, the scope of con-
duct covered, and whether the "international" component should be
determined by the perpetrator's objective, the status of the victim or the
territory in which the act occurred. The key problem in formulating a
definition acceptable to all nations is that one person's terrorist is another
person's free~iom fighter; one person's murderer is another person's spiri-
tual leader.' 19
The threat of reciprocal conduct based on the Passive Personality prin-
ciple formed the basis for the United States aversion to the principle over
100 years ago in the case of Cutting.120 In his communique of May 4,
1888 to the United States consul to Mexico, Secretary of State Bayard,
stated:
To say that [Cutting] may be tried in another country for his offense, simply
because its object happens to be a citizen of that country, would be to assert
that foreigners coming to the United States bring hither the penal laws of
the country from which they come, and thus subject citizens of the United
States in their own country to an indefinite'criminal responsibility. Such a
pretension can never be admitted by this Government.1 21
The threat imposed upon American citizens, which Mr. Bayard articu-
lated above, is ever more present today as the means of travel and com-
119. Indeed, when he was sentenced, Yunis raised this very issue when he asked, "Had I
been a member of the contra forces in Nicaragua and committed the same act, would my act
be considered terrorism or freedom-fighting?" Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1989, at A39, col. 1; L.A.
Times, Oct. 5, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
120. See 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 228, 237 (1906).
121. Id. at 238.
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munication have advanced. While it is true that terrorist acts of revenge
will still occur whether or not the United States expands its use of the
Passive Personality principle, the ability of unfriendly countries to justify
some of their actions against individuals which they label "terrorists" by
appealing to the precedent set by Tunis need not continue.
There is no doubt that unfriendly nations will exact their own, often
barbaric, form of justice. Barely nine months after the captain of the
U.S.S. Vincennes accidentally ordered the downing of an Iranian civilian
airliner, the captains's car was the object of a bombing attack by what
authorities believed to have been Iranian agents seeking revenge for the
downing of the airliner. 122 If indeed, as suspected, the car-bombing inci-
dent can be attributed to the Iranian government, then it must be viewed
as merely that state's chosen form of justice. If instead of meting out
justice in the form of a car-bombing, the Iranian agents had abducted
Captain Rogers and taken him to Iran to stand trial; they would find
judicial support for their action not only from the holding in Yunis,
grounded in the theory of the Passive Personality Principle, but also on
the basis of the United States longstanding policy of permitting ex-
traordinary apprehensions set down in Ker v. Illinois 123 and utilized in
Tunis.
Since Ker v. Illinois 124 was decided by the Supreme Court in favor of
the Government's extraordinary apprehension of a fugitive, one may be
tempted to hold it out as sound precedent for the district court's decision
in Tunis. However, several distinctions must be drawn between the two
cases. Ker involved the attempt to bring back a United States fugitive
fleeing the custody of an Illinois court that had already indicted him.
Furthermore, because of Peru's occupation by Chilean forces, there was
no effective government for United States authorities to negotiate with in
pursuance of the extradition treaty. In contrast, Tunis involved a Leba-
nese resident-citizen who was not a fugitive since no American grand
jury had returned an indictment against him. Furthermore, there were
two governments with which the United States could have negotiated,
122. N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1989, at Al, col. 2.
123. 119 U.S. 436 (1886). An Illinois citizen indicted for embezzlement and larceny had
fled to Peru, whose capital was occupied by Chilean forces. Because of the Chilean presence,
there was no Peruvian government with which the United States government could negotiate.
Subsequently, Ker was located and arrested by a private investigator who had been retained by
the United States government and was ultimately tried and convicted by an Illinois state court.
The court allowed this extraordinary arrest. This case represented the irony that although the
United States government had set out to arrest Ker via conventional methods, the Govern-
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Jordan and Lebanon, notwithstanding the weakness of Lebanon's
government.
Ker spawned a line of extraordinary apprehension cases. 125 Foremost
amongst those is United States v. Toscanino 126 which provided an excep-
tion to Ker. Toscanino forbade jurisdiction to a United States court if an
extraordinary apprehension was so violative and abusive, that it
"shock[ed] the conscience."1 27 Of import, however, is the fact that with
rare exception, 128 no district court has ever denied itself jurisdiction over
an extraordinary apprehension case because the apprehension was found
to have "shocked the conscience" pursuant to Toscanino. Despite this
fact, the Government's reliance on Ker and its progeny 129 to validate its
extraordinary apprehensions of foreign drug merchants has been a re-
sounding failure,1 30 with the possible exception of General Noriega.
Even this apprehension, however, has resulted in protestations from our
OAS allies.13i In addition, Noriega's arrest has been resoundly criticized
by such authorities as Stansfield Turner,132 Director of the CIA during
the Carter administration, and Congressman Charles Rangel, 133 Chair-
man of the Congressional Select Committee on Narcotics. Consequently,
resorting to a policy which is, at best, of questionable legality and, at
worst, a violation of international law, is problematic. Applying the
same policy to the apprehension of alleged terrorists probably would re-
125. See infra notes 126 & 128.
126. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1974).
127. Id. at 273 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952)).
128. But see United States v. Femandez-Caro, 677 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Tex 1987) (granting
defendant's motion to suppress fruits of search of his hotel room since the confession concern-
ing location of articles in hotel room had been extorted from defendant by Mexican officials
through use of physical torture).
129. See United States ex reL Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1001 (1975) (brutality must be at the hands of U.S. Law enforcement agents); United
States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 70-71 (2d. Cir. 1975) (not only must brutality be at hands of U.S.
law enforcement agents, but defendant must provide proof of U.S. law enforcement involve-
ment); United States v. Lopez, 542 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1976) (strict adherence to 2d Circuit's
holding in Lira); see also United States v. Lara, 539 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1976). Although Lara
declined to apply the Toscanino principle explicitly, Lara suggests a further limitation of the
Toscanino exception by holding that the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant
where "U.S. agents played no direct role in the torture allegedly administered by the Panama-
nian authorities, and.., the defendant failed to prove that a U.S. Government agent was even
present at the time." 539 F.2d at 495.
130. The United States' victory in extraditing Jose Abello Silva, a transporter for the Me-
dellin drug cartel, from Colombia was dampened by the acknowledgment that he is not on the
U.S. Justice Department's list of the 12 most wanted Colombian traffickers. N.Y. Times, Oct.
30, 1989, at A13, col. 1.
131. N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1989, at A15, col. 5.
132. Wolf, U.S. Gets Noriega but Moscow Scores Panama Points, Reuters, Jan. 7, 1990.
133. Wash. Post, Jan. 18, 1990, at AI5, col. 3.
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sult in even greater protestations and divisiveness both domestically and
abroad.
If Yunis is accepted under international law, then, conceivably, Iran
could dispatch its FBI counterpart to the United States, abduct Captain
Rogers, claim that they had "found" him, drawing support from the
Universality principle, and claim subject matter jurisdiction on the basis
of the Passive Personality principle, since the victims of the incident had
been nationals of Iran. As the state of the Passive Personality principle
stands now, post-Yunis, the presence of an Iranian victim aboard any
airliner, no matter what its registry, would not preclude Iranian subject
matter jurisdiction.
It is conceded that states such as Iran, Syria, and Libya have their own
agenda, and will continue to exact revenge as they see fit, irrespective of
any precedent set down by Yunis. However, there are any number of
countries, which, for various reasons, have vacillated in their relations
with the United States, sometimes drawing closer, sometimes moving
away.134 This article suggests that the focus should be centered on the
potential reciprocal conduct emanating from these "middle ground"
countries. Unlike states sponsoring terrorism, these "middle ground"
states do attempt to adhere to norms of international law and to base
their foreign relations policies accordingly. If and when they are pres-
sured by more fanatical states, or by their underground movements, to
take violent measures, they will find support for such extraordinary ac-
tions in Yunis.
Moreover, these "middle ground" countries may well buttress their
reliance on Yunis with the 1989 Department of Justice Directive ("Di-
rective"). 135 The Directive gives FBI agents wide latitude for engaging
in the extraordinary apprehension of fugitives by permitting FBI agents
to enter a foreign country, seize a foreign national, and return him to the
United States, without first notifying the appropriate foreign govern-
ment. The 1989 Directive was issued June 21, 1989 in blatant disregard
of internationally accepted norms of asserting extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
It should be noted that the Directive is violative not only of interna-
tional law, but also of other Department of Justice Directives. The 1980
134. The relationship of the United States and O.A.S. during the later years of Noriega's
reign of power contrasts sharply with the O.A.S. criticism of the United States apprehension of
Noriega. See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1989, at A15, col. 5.
135. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1989, at A6, col. 4. See also United States v. Verdugo-Urguidez,
58 U.S.L.W. 4263 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1990). (Fourth Amendment does not apply to search and
seizure by U.S. law enforcement agents of property owned by a nonresident alien and located
in a foreign country.)
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Directive, issued during President Carter's term in office, specifically pre-
cluded the FBI from seizing fugitives in foreign countries without ob-
taining consent from the rightful authorities. In the 1980 Directive, it
was specifically stated that FBI agents and/or their counterparts who
disobeyed the Directive could face criminal prosecution in the United
States for kidnapping. However, shortly after the arrest of Yunis, Ste-
phen Trott, then head of the United States Department of Justice Crimi-
nal Division, opined that United States courts would not look with
disdain upon abductions of Middle Eastern terrorists, when he stated:
"If FBI agents hypothetically ran over to Beirut with a net, snagged
somebody and brought him back here, the court would say, 'we don't
care how long he was in the net; they fed him, he's here.' "136 Arguably,
one can directly attribute the 1989 Directive's issuance to the Govern-
ment's originally, frustrated efforts to obtain custody of General Manuel
Noriega and the successful apprehension and prosecution of Fawaz
Yunis.
B. United States v. Yuni" A Dangerous Precedent
Fawaz Yunis was convicted on March 14, 1989. The jury found him
guilty of hostage-taking, aircraft piracy and conspiracy. 137 Coinciden-
tally, the 1989 Directive was issued June 21, 1989, a mere one month
after Yunis was convicted. Barely three months later, Yunis was sen-
tenced, on October 4, 1989, by District Court Judge Aubrey Robinson,
to serve thirty years for hostage-taking, twenty years for aircraft piracy,
and five years for conspiracy. 13 8 In declining the Government's request
for an imposition of a life sentence, Judge Robinson noted Yunis' "sensi-
tivity" evidenced by his permitting "two people with serious medical
conditions to disembark" as a mitigating factor, and sentenced him ac-
cordingly. 139 Nevertheless, Judge Robinson concluded that a long prison
term was necessitated, since, "time 'will never wipe out what is in the
minds' of the plane's passengers and crew." 14° Although the maximum
sentence was not imposed, Assistant United States Attorney Jay B. Ste-
vens stated that the sentence was satisfactory since "'it vindicates the
136. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1986, at Al, col. 4 & A10, col. 6.
137. Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 1989, at Al, col. 2; L.A. Times, Mar. 14, 1989, at 1, col. 1;
Chicago Tribune, Mar. 15, 1989, at 10, col. 1; London Daily Telegraph, Mar. 16, 1989, at 16.
138. The terms are to run concurrently, and Yunis will be given credit for the two years he
served in prison awaiting trial and sentencing. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1989, at A7, col. 1;
London Daily Telegraph, Oct. 5, 1989, at 10.
139. L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
140. Chicago Tribune, Oct. 5, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
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victims in this case, it is a substantial punishment, and it sends a clear
message' that terrorists and air pirates will be prosecuted." 141
To date, it is impossible to chronicle how many countries have adopted
Yunis as precedent, or foretell how many will rely on it in the future
since only a few months have elapsed since Yunis was sentenced and the
1989 Directive was issued. However, it is significant that the only coun-
try which has most recently engaged in an extraordinary apprehension,
specifically and expressly relying on Yunis, was Israel, a United States
ally. Although Israel is not in a declared war with Lebanon, Israel is in a
declared war with Syria, and Syria maintains substantial control over
Lebanon's affairs. Israel has consistently invoked the anticipatory self-
defense provisions of article 51 of the United Nations Charter 142 when it
has conducted an abduction in the territory of either of these states.
On July 28, 1989 Israeli commandos stormed an apartment in a Leba-
nese village, seeking and capturing Sheik Abdul Karim Obeid, the feared
leader of one of Lebanon's most violent pro-Iranian groups, the Party of
God (Hezbollah). 143 The Israeli commandos spirited Obeid and two of
his aides back to Israel, where they were incarcerated. When the Israelis
abducted Sheik Obeid from Lebanon on July 28, 1989, they chose not to
claim anticipatory self-defense, but to rely for support on the United
States action in Yunis. 144
The parallels between this abduction and that carried out by the
United States against Yunis are startling, especially in light of the United
States condemnation of the Obeid capture. 145 First, the Israeli govern-
ment waited fourteen hours after the abduction before disclosing its de-
tails to the media.146 The United States kept details of Yunis' abduction
141. Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1989 at A39, col. 3; see also N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1989 at A7, col.
1; L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1989 at 6, col 1.
142. Article 51 provides that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and secur-
ity. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be im-
mediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
143. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
144. Id.
145. See U.S. Avoids Direct Criticism of Israeli Raid, Reuters, Aug. 28, 1989: "In July,
asked about the kidnapping by Israel of Sheikh Abdel Karim Obeid, Bush implicitly con-
demned the seizure by saying that kidnapping did not serve the cause of peace." See also N.Y.
Times, Aug. 1, 1989, at A7, col. 6 (Sen. Robert Dole's condemnation of Israel's abduction of
Sheik Obeid).
146. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1989, at Al, col.1.
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secret until Yunis was arraigned in the United States, five days after his
seizure on the Mediterranean. 147 Second, Israel immediately termed the
capture of Obeid as an "arrest," precipitated on the grounds that Obeid
was a "preacher, inciter, and, at times, a planner of attacks against
Israel." 145 Similarly, a senior'United States Justice Department official
stressed that Yunis' arrest "was not a kidnapping and waspursuant to a
warrant" issued in Washington D.C. on September 11, 1987.149 Third,
and most ominously, when defending his government's actions, Israeli
Cabinet Minister Ehud Olmert found precedent in the action of the
United States:
[I]n dealing with these terrorists you must take extraordinary measures,
and even the United States of America, just two years ago, kidnapped one
of these Hezbollah leaders, because you can't just negotiate with them. 150
Clearly, Mr. Olmert was referring to the United States abduction of
Yunis in 1987. When presented with the question of why the Israeli gov-
ernment did not consider the possibility that Obeid's kidnapping would
result in the retaliatory murder of Colonel Higgins, one of the American
hostages held in Lebanon, Olmert responded: "Don't forget that when
your country two years ago kidnapped Fawaz Yunis, also a Hezbollah
man from more or less the same group, this question could have been
asked with the same validity."151 The execution of Colonel Higgins un-
derscores the fact that even though the United States may not be the
primary target of a violent act of reciprocal conduct, its vital interests
may be directly or indirectly threatened when another country, relying
on Yunis, commits an act of extraordinary apprehension.
There is no doubt that Israel was looking to the precedent set by Yunis
to justify its actions. Comparing the United States abduction of Yunis
with Israel's abduction of Obeid, it seems that the Israeli actions were
more justified since Yunis was considered by Reagan Administration offi-
cials as a "hired gun" and not a major strategist involved in planning
terror operations, 152 while Obeid was the leading figure of Hezbollah in
south Lebanon and played an important role in organizing actions
against Israel's continuing presence in the south Lebanon "security
147. N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1987, at Al, col. 5.
148. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
149. N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1987, at All, col. 6.
150. Nightline: Hezbollah Claims Hostage Killed (ABC television broadcast, July 31,
1989) (transcript on file at Journal Graphics, Inc., New York, N.Y.).
151. Id.
152. N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1987, at A3, col. 4.
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zone." 153 The fact that Yunis was a relatively minor character in inter-
national terrorism was reiterated by noted authority Robert Kupperman,
a specialist for the Center for Strategic and National Studies in Washing-
ton, D.C. He stated that "at best, [Yunis] is a second-tier hijacker."' 54
Authorities on terrorism also assert that the hijacking in which he alleg-
edly took part hardly ranked among the world's major terrorist inci-
dents.' 55 For the United States to condemn the extraordinary
apprehension of a major Islamic terrorist leader, Obeid, while expending
immense resources to capture the "hired gun," Yunis, is nothing less
than hypocrisy.
If, in the interest of combatting international terrorism, United States
courts are going to overrule an historical aversion to the Passive Person-
ality principle, then it is imperative that the perpetrator's offense have a
significant nexus to the interests of the United States. That nexus must
evidence intent on the terrorist's part of specifically singling out United
States nationals to be the victims in furthering his goals. This approach
is compatible with the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.
The Restatement (Third) has retreated from its predecessor's strong dis-
favor towards the Passive Personality principle by stating in a note to
Section 402:
The [Passive Personality] principle has not been generally accepted for ordi-
nary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist
and other organized attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their nation-
ality, or to assassination of a state's diplomatic representatives or other
officials.156
There is no indication that Yunis' seizure of the Jordanian airliner was
predicated on the American nationality of three of the passengers. To
the contrary, Yunis is reported to have personally reassured the three
Americans on board that they would not be harmed. 157 In order to in-
153. Muir, Lebanese Shiites Dispute Gains to Israel From Kidnapping, Christian Sei. Moni-
tor, Aug. 2, 1989, at 3, col 1.
154. L.A. Times, Feb. 20, 1989, at 14, col. 1.
155. Wash. Post, Feb. 27, 1989, at A14, col. 2.
156. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402 note (emphasis added).
157. United States v. Yunis, Government's Omnibus Response to Defendant's Pretrial
Motions, at 18. See also Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventions for the Suppression of Unlaw-
ful Seizure and Interference with Aircraft (Part. 1): The Hague Convention, 13 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 381 (1974), for an illustration of the fact that not all hijackers have the same
characteristics. An analysis of the reported hijackings since 1930 results in the identification
of five basic types of hijackers: (1) the disgruntled national who unlawfully seizes an aircraft
and commands its flight to a country which shares his political ideology; (2) the so-called
"flying commando" bent on the triple goal of political blackmail, destruction of the aircraft,
and incarceration or death of its passengers, so as to focus world attention on his cause; (3) the
mentally deranged individual who has chosen hijacking either as a device to gain recognition
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crease respect for the Passive Personality principle and maintain its in-
tegrity, the courts must demand that the United States government
establish that United States citizens were not merely the unfortunate
chance victims of a politically motivated offense, but that their very iden-
tity as Americans was instrumental in the terrorist's objectives. Only
then can the United States lessen the likelihood of devastating reciprocal
reprisals from unfriendly nations.
The implication is clear that other countries will begin to justify state-
ordered "kidnapping" by citing the United States actions in Yunis.
While Israel may be justified in taking the steps that it did on the basis
that it is in an undeclared war, it is significant that a high-ranking Israeli
official felt compelled to point to the United States abduction of Yunis
for support.
C. A Sound Interpretation of the Universality Principle Is
Fundamental to World Order
Fear of reciprocal assertions of jurisdiction is not the only reason why
Yunis must not be allowed to stand as precedent. The fragile relations
between nations is the other overriding reason. The pivotal role of cus-
tom in international law has been defined thus:
[I]ntemational custom results from similar and repeated acts by states -
repeated with the conscious conviction of the parties that they are acting in
conformity with law. Thus there would be two factors in the formation of
custom: (1) a material fact - the repetition of similar acts by states, and
(2) a psychological element usually called the opinion juris sive necessitatis
- the feeling on the part of the states that in acting as they act they are
fulfilling a legal obligation.158
It follows that if custom is the accepted repetition of certain acts by
states, and this repetition induces predictability, then the United States
must respect the consequences of setting a new precedent when it ab-
ducts a suspect and claims jurisdiction under the Universal theory on the
basis of the suspect being "found."
Prior to resorting to extraordinary apprehensions, an effort to contact
and persuade interested states to take action is essential. Apparently,
this approach was not contemplated in Yunis. Speaking with reporters
several days after seizing Yunis, Justice Department officials "empha-
and notoriety or as a mode of escape from intolerable psychological pressures; (4) the common
criminal who uses the aircraft as a vehicle of escape from pending prosecution or incarcera-
tion; and (5) the extortionist who has chosen the hijacking route as an avenue to instant
wealth. Id.
158. D. GREIG, supra note 9, at 16 (citing Kopelman, Custom as a Means of the Creation
of International Law, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 129 (1937)).
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sized that no other country had been involved [in the arrest], and that the
operation had been executed entirely by United States law enforcement
and military officials." 159 Even if one attributes jurisdiction over hos-
tage-taking based on the Universality theory, underlying that theory is
the tacit understanding that jurisdictional preference must be given to
the state asserting territorial jurisdiction.16  It is conceded that the gov-
ernment in Lebanon, which could claim jurisdiction based on the Na-
tionality and Territoriality principles is in disarray and, therefore, in no
position to assert jurisdiction. However, there is no indication that there
were negotiations between the United States and Jordan, even though
Jordan was waging its own campaign to locate Yunis. Jordan, the coun-
try of airline registration, was empowered to claim jurisdiction on the
basis of territoriality.
This occurrence of competing jurisdictions parallels the situation en-
countered when the United States, frustrated by Egypt's act of granting
exit permission to the suspected hijackers of the Achille Lauro,1 61 inter-
cepted the Egyptian airliner carrying the four gunmen and forced the
airliner to land. As in the present case, the interception was said to have
occurred without the knowledge of Egypt, or Italy,162 the country of re-
gistration for the ship. No matter how frustrated the United States was
with Egypt's action in allowing the hijackers to leave Egyptian territory,
"Egypt's failure to carry out its own obligations under the Hostage Con-
vention did not permit the United States to exercise self help to bring the
alleged hijackers of the Achille Lauro to justice. ' 163
Likewise, the failure of Lebanon and Jordan 164 to assert jurisdiction
over Yunis did not permit the United States to mock the intention of the
Universality principle by abducting Yunis under the guise of "finding"
159. N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1987, at Al, col. 5.
160. Hostage Taking Convention, supra note 4.
161. It will be recalled that this October 1985 affair involved the seizing of an Italian
registered cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, by four armed men who were allegedly members of
the Palestine Liberation Front. During the seizure, the hijackers killed a wheelchair-bound
passenger, Leon Klinghoffer. The individual supposedly behind the entire operation, Moham-
med Abbas Zaidan, remained on shore, orchestrating the group's moves via radio contact.
When Abbas succeeded in negotiating with Egyptian authorities for the exchange of the ship's
hostages for the safe passage of the terrorists out of Egypt, the Achille Lauro returned to Port
Said. The next day, United States Navy planes intercepted the Egyptian aircraft carrying the
hijackers and Abbas and forced the aircraft to land at a NATO base in Sicily. The Italians
refused to extradite the terrorists and Abbas because they wanted to try the five in Italy, and
because the United States maintains the death penalty. McGinley, The Achille Laura Affair -
Implications for International Law, 52 TENN. L. RV. 691-93 (1985).
162. N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at Al, col. 5.
163. McGinley, supra note 161, at 720.
164. Lebanon had no obligation under the Hostage Taking Convention to assert jurisdic-
tion over Yunis, because Lebanon was not a party to the Convention. The operative section of
the Convention, had Lebanon been a signatory, is article 5(1)(b):
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him for purposes of Universal jurisdiction. Moreover, by taking the
overt, antagonistic steps that the United States did, rather than covertly
.aiding Jordan in the apprehension of Yunis, the United States subjected
itself to violent reciprocal conduct and international scorn. It is critical
to note the difference between an offender being "found" within the terri-
tory of a state seeking jurisdiction and an offender who is captured
outside the territory and then subsequently brought into that state.
Tracing the evolution of the Universality principle from its roots in
piracy reveals that the United States has attached an improper meaning
to the concept of an offender being "found." Although there have been
acts of violence and conquest by one country against another since time
immemorial, piracy on the high seas was the first offense specifically la-
beled as a crime against all nations of the world.165 The salient attributes
of piracy were the fact that the pirate ship and its crew owed allegiance
to no country, the globe-trotting pirates exacted tremendous damages on
the burgeoning international flow of commerce, and no country would
offend another country's sovereignty by capturing and punishing the
pirates.
Thus, in 1958, when the authors of the Convention on the High Seas 166
sought to codify the international view towards sea piracy, they found
ample support for asserting that a state may punish a pirate encountered
within its territory, and also that a state may pursue a pirate and then
bring him into that state's territory. Specifically, article 19 of the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas states:
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State,
every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by pirates and
under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property
on board. 167
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its juris-
diction over any of the offenses set forth in article 1 which are committed:...
(b) by any of its nationals or, if that State considers it appropriate, by those stateless
persons who have their habitual residence in its territory.
Jordan's obligation to establish jurisdiction is found in article 5(l)(a) which states:
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its juris-
diction over any of the offenses set forth in article 1 which are committd:
(a) in its territory or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State.
The language of the Convention is one of obligation, not merely cooperation as the Convention
on the High Seas, infra note 166, had been. Because Jordan was the state of registration for
the aircraft, it did have a treaty obligation. However, that obligation was not absolute. Jordan
was required only to take necessary steps; its failure to apprehend Yunis cannot be interpreted
as depriving it of the right to have continued taking steps to bring Yunis to justice.
165. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see generally, J. STARKE, supra note 8, ch. 9.
166. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82.
167. Id. at art. 19, 13 U.S.T. at 2317.
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The Geneva Convention on the High Seas clearly recognizes the
Universality principle as a basis of jurisdiction. This basis of jurisdiction
is a major exception to the normal rule that jurisdiction follows the flag
of the country to which the ship is registered. Under the piracy excep-
tion to the Territoriality principle, it is not necessary that the seizing
state negotiate with another state asserting territorial jurisdiction because
the very nature of piracy presupposes that the pirate vessel is stateless
and thus no other state is competing for territorial jurisdiction.
The concept of apprehending an offender is next encountered in the
Tokyo Convention. Chapter V of that convention outlines the powers
and duties of states. 168 Even though by 1963 offenses committed on
board civil aircraft had taken on universal condemnation, the Tokyo
Convention does not provide for absolute jurisdiction for any state that
captures the offender. Unlike the Convention on the High Seas, stringent
qualifications are placed on when a state can assert jurisdiction and when
it cannot.169
The first time wide latitude is given to the concept of finding the of-
fender is in the Hague Convention. The main provisions of the Hague
Convention create universal jurisdiction for prosecution of hijackers.
Furthermore, the Convention obligates the signatories either to prosecute
or to extradite the offenders. As stated by article 7:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found
shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever,
and whether or not the offense was committed in its territory, to submit the
case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. 170
168. Tokyo Convention, supra note 33, 20 U.S.T. at 2948. Chapter V, art. 13 entities, but
does not obligate, states to enter into possession of offenders in the following manner:
1. Any Contracting State shall take delivery of any person whom the aircraft com-
mander delivers pursuant to Article 9, paragraph 1.
2. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any Contracting State shall
take custody or other measures to ensure the presence of any person suspected of an act
contemplated in Article 11, paragraph 1 and of any person of whom it has taken delivery.
The custody and other measures shall be as provided in the law of that State but may only
be continued for such time as is reasonably necessary to enable any criminal or extradition
proceedings to be instituted.
Id.
Significantly, art. 9, para. 1, to which art. 13, para. I refers, states that:
The aircraft commander may deliver to the competent authorities of any Contracting
State in the territory of which the aircraft lands any person who he has reasonable
grounds to believe has committed on board the aircraft an act which, in his opinion, is a
serious offense according to the penal law of the State of registration of the aircraft.
Id. at 2947.
169. Tokyo Convention, supra note 33, Chapter II, 704 U.N.T.S. at 222-24.
170. Hague Convention, supra note 35, at 15.
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This is the first time the word "found" is encountered in conventions
covered by the Universality principle. It is reasonable to assume, how-
ever, that the framers of the Hague Convention intended to apply the
same restrictions on the word "found" that were implied in the Tokyo
Convention; namely, the contracting state into whose territory the hi-
jacker either commanded the plane or where the plane eventually landed
is the state in the territory of which the alleged offender is "found" for
the purposes of the Hague Convention.
Although the nature of the offenses covered in the Montreal Conven-
tion differ from those covered in the Hague Convention, the respective
articles dealing with gaining possession of the offender are identical.
Both conventions provide jurisdiction "whether or not the offense was
committed in its [the asserting state's] territory"; however, the intention
of article 7 as it stands in both conventions cannot be interpreted to in-
clude jurisdiction over those offenders who are "found" only as a result
of an extraordinary apprehension of the offender in territory far from the
contracting state's territory.
The foundation of the Universality principle is the recognition by all
state's that a crime is of such a potentially disastrous nature that it
should not go unpunished by any country. Surely, the authors of the
conventions would have contemplated that countries closest to the loca-
tion of the offender would be those within whose territory the offender
would be "found."
Finally, although it has by no means been accorded universal recogni-
tion, the Hostage Taking Convention provides further revelation of the
interpretation to be accorded the word "found." Significantly, the Hos-
tage Taking Convention, rather than expanding the definition of
"found," simply incorporates the identical language of the Hague and
Montreal Conventions in regard to the obligation to either extradite the
offender or prosecute him.171 It is more than logical to assume that the
original intention, articulated in the Tokyo Convention, was not to give
widespread jurisdiction to any country bent on pursuing an offender, but
rather to lessen the threat that an offender would go unpunished simply
because no country would assume jurisdiction to apprehend or try him.
The United States, in enacting the Hostage Taking Act, unfortunately
overlooked this rationale and chose instead to find support for its obtru-
sive measures in article 5 of the Hostage Taking Convention. 172 Article 5
171. Hostage Taking Convention, supra note 4, art. 8(1), 18 I.L.M. at 1460; Montreal
Convention, supra note 37, art. 7, 24 U.S.T. at 571; Hague Convention, supra note 35, art. 7,
22 U.S.T. at 1646.
172. Hostage Taking Convention, supra note 4.
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mandates that each state shall take measures necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over hostage-taking offenses where the alleged offender is
"present" in its territory and it does not extradite him either to the state
of registration of the airliner or to the state which was being compelled
by the actions of the offender. It is not insignificant that the authors of
the Hostage Taking Convention qualified this "presence" of the offender
by mandating jurisdiction only in the event that the offender is not extra-
dited. If the authors had intended for any state to assert jurisdiction on a
"first come, first serve" basis, then there would have been no need to
include the provision for extradition. The authors intended that the of-
fender be present in the contracting state's territory either as a result of
the plane landing in that state's territory or as a result of the offender
voluntarily entering the territory.
In sum, the Yunis court erred in two distinct areas in its application of
the Hostage Taking Act. In the first instance, the clear absence of an
overwhelming number of signatories to the pertinent conventions, as dis-
cussed herein, puts in doubt the notion that the conventions, and thus the
Hostage Taking Act, provided jurisdiction under the Universality princi-
ple. Secondly, in choosing to interpret the terms "in the presence of the
State" and "found in the State" to imply jurisdiction over an offender
who is captured elsewhere and transported back to the United States, the
United States grossly overlooks the original basis for extraterritorial ju-
risdiction. Both in regard to piracy on the high seas and aircraft offenses,
the concerns have historically focused on the fear that no country would
assert jurisdiction because of the lack of any clear territoriality.
V. Proposals
As this article has stressed, neither United States case law nor custom-
ary international law supports allowing the Passive Personality principle
to provide United States jurisdiction when the only nexus to the United
States is the fortuitous presence of a United States national.
A very interesting, though currently impractical, approach to resolv-
ing the issue presented herein has been proposed by a recognized interna-
tional law scholar. Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, who has written
extensively on international criminal law, has authored the Draft Inter-
national Criminal Code, published in 1980.173 The Draft International
Criminal Code seeks overall to address the fact that there is no statutory
codification of international crimes. The Draft Code provides for two
173. M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A DRAFr INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL CODE (1980) [hereinafter the Draft Code].
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bases of enforcing criminal laws: 174 either through an International
Criminal Court or through each nation's own criminal justice system. It
provides for one, unifying category of international crimes. Those crimes
include, inter alia: acts of torture, acts of piracy, crimes relating to inter-
national air communications, unlawful use of the mails, drug offenses,
and hostage-taking. 175
The Draft Code gives primary jurisdiction for all offenses arising under
it to an International Criminal Court. It is only in the event that the
court refuses to take jurisdiction over a given case that a state may assert
jurisdiction, and then only on a priority basis. 176 Thus, the Code pro-
vides for jurisdiction under the Passive Personality principle but only as
a means of last resort, and the court must first be satisfied that another
state is not more deserving of jurisdiction under the Territoriality princi-
ple or the Nationality principle. Such an International Criminal Code
and an International Criminal Court to enforce the provisions of the
Code would presumably reduce the specter of reciprocal acts against the
United States since the United States would not be disregarding another
state's interest, but rather would be acting in accordance with an ac-
cepted international code. Although there are tremendous obstacles
before the Draft Code may be implemented, it provides an excellent
framework for resolving the jurisdictional dilemmas presented by cases
such as Yunis.
In the near future, the United States may have another, more potent
weapon to fight terrorism. On August 3, 1989, the United States and the
Soviet Union reached an agreement whereby the two countries would
accept the binding arbitration of the International Court of Justice
(I.C.J.) regarding seven treaties, including the treaty dealing with hos-
tage-taking. 177 Ironically, the provisions of the agreement weaken the
United States primary defense of the actions it has taken in cases such as
the Achille Lauro and Yunis. Many people in the government have taken
174. Id. at 37.
175. Id. at 49.
176. Id. at 45. Article III, § 2 of the Draft Code provides:
In the event the [International Criminal] Court refuses to take jurisdiction over a given
case or over a given person accused of a violation of this Code the Contracting Parties will
have the right to exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with the order of priority which
follows: (a) the Contracting Party in whose territory the crime occurred in whole or in
part; (b) any contracting Party of which the accused is a national; (c) any Contracting
Party of which the victim is a national; (d) any other Contracting Party within whose
territory the accused may be found.
Id.
177. N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1989, at A5, col. 1. According to the agreement, Washington
and Moscow are to let the I.C.J. adjudicate disputes over the interpretation of treaties dealing
with aircraft hijacking, sabotage, and acts of terrorism.
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the position that self-help is the only solution when one country is unable
to try or extradite an accused terrorist.1 78 Under the provisions of the
U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement, however, disputes over extradition and other
treaty requirements will be settled by a special chamber of five judges
chosen by the contesting sides from the 15 members of the full court.
The verdict would be final and binding. 179
The agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union is
meant to engender confidence on the part of the rest of the world, so that
increasingly more countries will turn to the I.C.J. for adjudication of
their treaty disputes. It is acknowledged, however, that the U.S.-
U.S.S.R. proposal is currently only in its embryonic stage and sufficient
time has not yet passed to accurately judge its results.
Although both the notion of an International Criminal Court and the
U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement provide fertile ground for improvements in the
extraterritorial jurisdiction dilemma, history has shown what a mockery
most sovereigns make of such international sources of dispute resolution.
As long as other countries, both friendly and adversarial, witness the
United States resorting to extraordinary apprehension measures and dis-
torting the Passive Personality principle, those other countries will deem
themselves justified in taking the same, or even more ominous, measures.
The United States government conceded that Yunis' intent in hi-
jacking the Jordanian airliner was to pressure the Arab League into ex-
pelling all Palestinians from Lebanon.180 Thus, for purposes of the
Hostage Taking Convention, Yunis did possess the requisite intent to co-
erce a third party. 81 However, for purposes of asserting subject matter
jurisdiction by the United States, any clear nexus to the United States
was lacking.
Customary international law provides for two conventional ways of
obtaining custody of a suspect. A requesting country should either await
voluntary entry of the suspect into that state's territory, or it should util-
ize the extradition process.18 2 If, and only if, these measures fail, should
178. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1989, at Al, col. 4.
179. N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1989, at A5, col. 1.
180. N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1987, at Al, col. 5.
181. Hostage Taking Convention, supra note 4, at art. 1. Article 1 of the Hostage Taking
Convention dictates that the Convention only becomes operative if any person seizes or detains
and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person (hostage) "in order to
compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natu-
ral or juridical person, or a group of persons to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit
or implicit condition for the release of the hostage."
182. The United States, concerned with expanding its young nation and providing a safe
harbor to the world's oppressed, did not actively engage in extensive extradition treaties until
the mid-1800s. The first extradition treaty, the Jay treaty, signed by the United States and
Great Britain in 1794, was restricted to extradition for the offenses of murder and forgery.
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it resort to asserting jurisdiction on the basis of the Passive Personality
principle. Although the United States, as previously indicated, has never
recognized the competency of the Passive Personality principle to stand
alone, there may be special circumstances in which its use, alone, may be
invoked. Such use must be dictated by a new multilateral treaty or by
amending18 3 the Hostage Taking Convention. Although the Hostage
Taking Convention was ratified by only 57 countries, clearly signaling,
amongst other things, the dissatisfaction of the majority of the U.N.
members with the Convention's "soft" qualification of the use of the Pas-
sive Personality principle,1 84 amending the Convention to more clearly
restrict use of the Passive Personality principle may prove satisfactory.
A new or amended convention which deletes reference to terrorism may
meet with greater ratification success, since such widespread disagree-
ment over the definition of terrorism exists.
The new or amended convention would provide for resort to the Pas-
sive Personality principle only if the following circumstances existed:
1) The presence of the contracting state's nationals was not fortuitous.
Clear evidence that the specific flight was chosen as a target because of
the presence of the contracting state's nationals must exist; and
2) No previous warning had been issued to the contracting state's na-
tionals by the contracting state advising them to stay away from that
specific geographic area because of conflict, violence or instability,
thereby reducing the contracting state's liability for its citizens who had
assumed the risk of dangerous travel; and
3) The contracting state's nationals were victimized specifically be-
cause of their status as citizens of that state, not merely because they held
a political affiliation contrary to the objectives and sympathies of the hi-
jackers. At the same time, a claim that victims were selected because of
their religion, ethnicity, or other non-political attribute would not rob the
contracting state of jurisdiction. If the victims had been selected accord-
Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, United States-Great Britain, art.
27, 8 Stat. 116. The first comprehensive treaty, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, was signed by
the United States and Great Britain on August 9, 1842. Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9,
1842, United States-Great Britain, art. 10, 8 Stat. 572.
183. "The most usual way of ensuring reconciliation of the provisions of treaties with
changing conditions is through amendment clauses inserted in the treaties themselves, thus
giving effect to the basic principle that a treaty may be amended by agreement of the parties
(ce. Vienna Convention, article 39)." J. STARKE, supra note 8, at 435.
184. Article 5(1)(d) of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages pro-
vides that:
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its juris-
diction over any of the offenses set forth in article 1 which are committed:...-
(d) with respect to a hostage who is a national of that State, if that State considers it
appropriate.
159
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ing to such criteria, the contracting state would retain authority to appre-
hend the hijacker;185 and
4) The contracting state is a third party being compelled by the hos-
tage-takers, and the hijackers are holding that state's nationals in further-
ance of compelling the state; and
5) Clear evidence exists that the hostage-taking act was not of the
genre falling within the political offense exception, since the perpetrator's
acts may be those specifically protected by the exception.18 6
Under these limited circumstances, there would be a sufficient nexus
between the hijacker's acts and the nationals of the state for the state to
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction based on the Passive Personality
principle.
In circumstances where the hijacked flight flew over the contracting
state's territory, occurred on one of the contracting state's planes, or was
destined for the contracting state, there would be no need to invoke the
Passive Personality principle since either the well-established Territorial-
ity principle or the Protective principle would provide sufficient basis for
jurisdiction. Likewise, the Protective principle would apply where the
contracting state's diplomats were taken hostage due to their diplomatic
or official status. An amended or new convention as proposed would
significantly mitigate the prospects of reciprocal conduct by non-aligned
countries since they would likely be signatories to such a convention, and
because the extraordinary apprehension would derive from a convention,
and not from the unauthorized, unilateral actions of one country. Pursu-
185. For example, if it was shown that a contracting state's nationals were selected specifi-
cally because of their Jewish faith, this would generally satisfy the requirement for application
of the Passive Personality principle. However, a distinction must be drawn between the status
of the Jewish person who is travelling in a manner or to a destination likely to put him on
guard, and one who is travelling purely for pleasure or non-confrontational business. A recent
example of the former, where protection would not extend, involved three American Jews,
headed by Rita E. Hauser, who travelled secretly to Stockholm to meet with Khalid al-Hassan,
an Arafat confidant and a co-founder of the PLO. N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1988, at Al, col. 5.
An example of the latter, where the Passive Personality principle would provide jurisdiction, is
the merciless killing of Leon Klinghoffer, a wheelchair-bound Jewish American by four men,
allegedly members of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Klinghoffer was a passenger on
board a cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, in the Mediterranean, not in an area likely to be subject
to violence. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
186. For a detailed analysis of the political offense exception, see Abramovsky, The Polit-
ical Offense Exception and the Extradition Process: The Enhancement of the Role of the U.S.
Judiciary, 13 HAsTiNGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 501-24 (1990).
One of the foundations of the exception, the Sprizzo test, provides for a balancing test in-
volving the following factors: (1) the nature of the act, (2) the context in which it is committed,
(3) the status of the party committing the act, (4) the nature of the organization on whose
behalf it is committed, and (5) the particularized circumstances of the place where the act
takes place.,In re Requested Extradition of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
The Sprizzo test is named after the district court judge who formulated the test.
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ant to a new or amended convention, Congress would be required to
amend section 1203(b)(1)(A) of the Hostage Taking Act 187 to include the
qualifications outlined above. Congress should likewise amend section
32(b) of the Destruction of Aircraft statute to limit the definition of
"found" to include only those occurrences where the offender enters the
United States voluntarily. Once again, this will lessen the prospect of
unfriendly nations stretching half-way across the globe to abduct an
American citizen allegedly guilty of an act considered heinous by the
unfriendly nation. Such a requirement will also reduce the likelihood of
animosity between countries with competing jurisdictional interests.
VI. Conclusion
While resorting to unilateral apprehension may, on occasion, result in
the apprehension of some alleged terrorists, the detriment that such a
policy poses substantially outweighs the benefits it presents to United
States nationals. As was discussed above, such a policy may well result
in abductions from the United States of United States citizens by its ene-
mies. The United States would be hard-pressed to denounce such con-
duct when its own precedent would be utilized to sanction its validity.
No body of nations has awarded the United States the role of "Policeman
of the World," conferring on it the right to stretch its long arm of juris-
diction half-way around the world to seize an offender when there are
other states more appropriately positioned to accomplish the same goal.
The United States may protect its interest and avoid worldwide criticism
by limiting application of the Passive Personality principle and the
Universality principle to those cases where a true and compelling nexus
to the United States exists. In fact, as the United States is seeking to find
a way to combat international terrorism while avoiding alienating and
antagonizing other, equally interested countries, it would do well for its
lawmakers to remember that an essential component of terrorism is its
internationalism. The United States cannot presume that it is the only
country with the desire and resources to combat this growing
phenomenon.
187. 18 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1)(A) (1989) now provides merely that jurisdiction may be exer-
cised extraterritorially if "the offender or the person seized is a national of the United States
S.. " (emphasis added).
